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Abstract: The problem that was thrown up during
the Hypatia controversy is a systemic one. I argue
that objections to Tuvel’s essay regarding its exclu-
sion of perspectives from marginalized points of
view should be re-framed as a disciplinary wide is-
sue. I show some ways in which the universal ap-
plicability and vantage point often assumed in
canonical writings in philosophy, specifically on his-
tory and personal identity, emerge from specific
contexts and points of view. I demonstrate what is at
stake in recognizing the particularity of these con-
texts. I find that the false dichotomy between seem-
ingly interested “social justice” scholarship and
disinterested inquiries into truth, which I hold per-
petuates the disciplinary conditions that produced
the Hypatia controversy.
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The controversy following the publication of Re-becca Tuvel’s essay titled “In Defense of Trans-
genderism,” published in Hypatia (March 2017),
revealed longstanding schisms in the discipline of
philosophy. In her essay, Tuvel identifies an inconsist-
ency between the social acceptance of “transgender-
ism” and “transracialism” by citing the examples of
Caitlyn Jenner and Rachel Dolezal. These figures
function as a springboard for Tuvel’s discussion of the
conventions of gender transition and racial passing.
She argues that these identities are analogous and
since one is irrefutably acceptable the other should be
considered acceptable too.1 Animating the controversy
were two opposed yet oddly overlapping responses:
while some claimed that Tuvel perpetuated a harmful
epistemic method by not including the perspectives
and scholarship of black and transpersons (“Open
Letter to Hypatia,” 2017; Winnubust 2017), others
held that the essay did not cause exceptional harm be-
cause the article’s methods reflect the norms of the
discipline (Weinberg 2017a) . Interestingly, both re-
sponses suggest that Tuvel’s essay did not aberrate
from but rather exemplified the genre of philosophical
analysis. The implications of this shared view,
however, are understood in vastly different ways by
these two responses. In this essay, I explore the stakes
of this overlapping yet dissenting recognition of the
disciplinary nature ofTuvel’s article.
Philosophy, like all disciplines, has a form.2 That is, in
order to be recognized as an argument in the discip-
line, an essay needs to observe certain formal require-
ments (Dotson 2012) . Yet the formal elements of the
discipline remain unmarked as attributes of the form,
so though they are present they may not be reckoned.
They remain unrecognizable as discipline-specific.
There is much at stake in naming and studying the
form of the discipline, and the Hypatia controversy is
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a productive site at which to draw out the formal at-
tributes of philosophy, making them more recogniz-
able and therefore more open for accountability. In
this essay, I discuss two disciplinary attributes that are
at the heart of the canonical and contemporary
methods, attributes which are prevailing but under-
theorized in the controversy: the claim to universality
and the claim to abstraction. Moreover, in what fol-
lows I unpack the effects of these formal conventions
on ideas of personal identity and of history. Finally, I
argue that contrary to claims, these seemingly ab-
stract and universal ideas carry significant traces of
their particular context and that overlooking the de-
tails of its context is harmful. This is the key point of
my essay. The open letter, which was one of the driv-
ing engines of the controversy, demanded a retraction
of Tuvel’s article on the grounds that it caused epi-
stemic harm (“Open Letter”) . Even before the letter
was delivered to the journal, the associate board apo-
logized for the harms caused by the article (Weinberg
2017b) . This specific charge of harm needs to be
taken very seriously in the context of a discipline
whose formal norms have a long-standing record of
epistemic harm. Tuvel’s essay observes the disciplinary
forms of philosophy. I argue that to isolate the cri-
tique of this epistemic method to Tuvel’s essay alone
and to demand its retraction overlooks how her argu-
ment is produced within the intellectual tradition of
Western philosophy. In short, if there was a problem
brought into focus during the Hypatia controversy, it
was a systemic one. Accordingly, what is central to
my own argument is that Tuvel’s article should be
taken as an example of disciplinarity in philosophy,
rather than a sole or outlier example. I take the con-
troversy to be an invitation to scrutinize philosophy-
qua-discipline. The call for retraction, on the terms of
my argument, becomes itself a perplexing expression
of disciplinarity, rather than an incisive critique of
Tuvel’s project. The very charge of “harm” itself be-
comes an expression of philosophical commitment:
to think with and against, in the name of cross- and
inter-disciplinary forms and methods.
Abstraction and Universality as
Disciplinary Form
What kinds of knowledge are made possible, or con-
versely, rendered impossible, when an inquiry ac-
knowledges its ties to the particular context out of
which it emerged? This question is an important one,
even if it is often evaded by knowledge-seekers, and
even if the inquiry in question is seeking to invoke
“universal” ideas such as justice or beauty. In the dis-
cipline of philosophy, it is quite common to pursue
abstract inquiries rigorously, while at the same time to
bracket the particular context(s) of the philosophical
“problem” under investigation. If anything, this lack
of attentiveness to the context of the problem is in-
sisted upon in the name of good philosophical virtues
like clarity, objectivity, and the universality of legitim-
ate knowledge. Put more strongly, questions such as
“what is identity?” or “what is history?” are considered
for inclusion in the corpus of philosophical know-
ledge only after the particularities of any discernible
context have been sloughed off to reveal a universal
question. In simple terms, the philosophical method
consists of bracketing unnecessary contextual details
in order to work out the answer to the problem in the
abstract. Yet when this method plays out in the con-
text of professional philosophy, it is usually not able to
achieve such abstractions. Indeed, one of the aims of
this article is to demonstrate how philosophical ideas,
particularly social and political theories, fail to leave
or abstract away from their contexts, despite vested
interests that they do so. This failure emerges, in par-
ticular, out of a twofold tendency: a given context is
assumed universal and this assumption remains unac-
knowledged (and most likely unrecognized) by the
philosopher.
What is at stake in assuming one’s own particular
context to be universal?3 Consider how the following
method of abstraction is not unique to Tuvel’s essay,
but central to writings in the discipline of philosophy:
for the purported sake of clarity of examination, a
problem, including a social-political problem, is
placed into an abstract realm. In that realm, the argu-
ment is entertained, explored, and concluded without
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any significant interruption from historical, literary,
and anthropological discourses. Once the problem is
resolved, its conclusion is taken back out of the ab-
stract sphere and assumed to be universally “applic-
able,” sometimes with minor adjustments to
accommodate the differences between various social
and material contexts. This method is as old as philo-
sophy itself: we see it in Plato in the fourth century
BCE, Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century,
Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century, George
Friedrich Hegel and John Stuart Mill in the nine-
teenth century, John Rawls in twentieth century, and
in every major canonical thinker in the history of
philosophy.
Here, I want to be clear that I am not making a case
against abstraction. Abstraction is necessary for
thinking and for conscious movement. To ask us to
abandon it would be as if asking us to forgo thought
itself. It would amount to asking people to write laws
without an idea of justice, to make moral decisions
without a conception of good and evil, to multiply
and divide without numbers, and to never create a
new recipe or make a map. Therefore, I am certainly
not asking us to stop thinking, counting, cooking,
and travelling. Instead, I am asking us to open that
abstract realm of philosophical thought further, and
to contaminate that sphere with contradictory ideas
and discourses from other disciplines, before settling
upon our questions and, certainly, before arriving at
our conclusions. Such cross- and inter-disciplinary
contamination is especially urgent when we contem-
plate our social world and ourselves within it, as, for
example, when we consider arguments about iden-
tity.
Let us explore how the subject of “personal identity”
has been taken up in the discipline of philosophy in
relation to the claims of abstraction and universality.
Traditionally, this question asks: On what basis can I
say that I am the same person today as I was yester-
day and will be tomorrow? What is the criterion for
claiming that one is the same self over time? The
usual suspects for this criterion have been the soul,
the body, one’s mind, or a combination of each of
them. John Locke, writing in the late seventeenth
century, invokes the now famous example of the
prince and the cobbler whose bodies swap their “souls
carrying the consciousness” (Locke 1689) . Even if the
body of the cobbler were to be recognized by others as
that of the cobbler, he would still be the prince be-
cause he would have the consciousness of the prince.
“Consciousness alone unites actions into the same
Person,” states Locke definitively (1689) . In a bid to
emphasize that it is not the substance that determines
the sameness of the person over time, he engages in
another thought experiment and asks us to imagine
our little finger being cut off. As long as our con-
sciousness remains intact we would continue to be the
same person, despite the missing little finger. Over
three hundred and fifty years later, Daniel Dennett, in
a work of philosophical science fiction, takes this ima-
ginative exercise about the loss of the finger and ex-
tends it to the loss of the entire body. He tells an
exciting story about a scientist hired by NASA to re-
cover a dislodged nuclear warhead buried under-
ground. His body and brain were separated. When his
body died, another body was created, and his memor-
ies were recreated on a computer. At different points,
different bodies and brains were hooked up. We are
left asking: What constitutes the self? The brain, body,
memories, or a combination of each of these? Both
Locke and Dennett’s work on personal identity appear
in many introductory philosophy anthologies and are
widely taught in freshman courses across North
America. The mind-body dualism and the puzzles
they present in this story are framed in the terms laid
out already in Locke’s writings: imaginary musings,
which are not tied to a specific “real” world context,
lead to conclusions that are understood to be univer-
sally applicable to all contexts.
Feminist philosopher Susan Brison pursues a related
but different line of inquiry. She poses questions of
personal identity in the specific context of trauma.
Survivors of war and violence who are suffering
trauma often claim that they died in the war, or that
they miss the person they used to be (2003, 38) . Bris-
on takes up the question about the criteria of the con-
tinued self by situating it in the specific, named
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context of those who have written about the effects
of trauma on themselves. She wonders what it means
to claim that one’s continued identity is situated in
memory when one’s memory has been partly erased
or re-arranged, and when flashbacks seem like the
present. To the survivor of trauma, one’s body
(which is inseparable from one’s mind) also does not
present itself as a viable site for the continued self.
Brison, herself a survivor of assault, found that in
experiences of trauma, the discreet categories in the
mind-body dualism seem like a myth rather than
convincing and robust descriptions of human life.
Many traditionally assigned psychic states, Brison
writes, present themselves as bodily symptoms and
vice versa (2003, 44) . Eventually, Brison turns to the
narrative self as the possible basis on which the self
can be represented as continuous before and after the
experience of trauma. One of the effects of past the-
orization of personal identity, which looks to other-
worldly settings rather than to narratives by people
who speak about having lost their selves and having
experienced the very loss of continuity in question, is
that philosophy stops being an effective resource for
those who need it the most.
Though the experience of trauma is common in our
society, and survivors speak of it in terms of outliv-
ing their former selves and inquire what it means to
no longer be the person they once were, philosoph-
ers have largely overlooked these writings in their
discussions of personal identity. As Brison notes:
Philosophers writing about the self have, at
least since Locke, puzzled over such questions
as whether persons can survive the loss or ex-
change of their minds, brains consciousness,
memories, characters, and/or bodies. In recent
years, increasingly gruesome and high-tech
thought experiments involving fusion, fission,
freezing, dissolution, reconstitution, and/or
teletransportation of an individual have been
devised to test our intuitions about who, if
anyone, survives such permutations. Given
philosophers’ preoccupation with personal
identity in extreme, life threatening, and pos-
sibly self-annihilating situations, it is odd that
they have neglected to consider the accounts of
actual trauma victims who report that they are
not the same person they were prior to their
traumatic transformations. (Brison 2003, 38-
39)
Brison explains this phenomenon by saying that
philosophers are trained to look away from the “messy
real world” in favour of a fantasized “neater” and
“controllable” realm as the preferred setting for con-
templating philosophical problems (Brison 2003, 39) .
Perhaps this disciplinary move is based on the as-
sumption that imagined otherworldly contexts can
proximate a universal context by virtue of its seeming
removal from contingent historical and social condi-
tions in this world. After all, the thought experiment
of a person undergoing brain-body transplants, or
duplicating his memories on a computer, is assumed
to be universally applicable because it is not particular
to any specific person’s “real” experience. In fact, it
may even be tempting to think of these fantastical
settings as universal because one can easily swap out
one socially assigned identity, such as gender, race, or
religious identity, for another. We have seen such a
move in the recent trend in philosophy wherein the
traditionally assigned pronoun “he” is swapped for
“she,” leaving everything else about the argument in-
tact. However, what these nearly self-annihilating
mind-body thought experiments tend to miss is that
the protagonists in these examples have already been
imagined as invulnerable to trauma and immune
from psychological dissociative states, even while they
are subject to morbid experiments. In personal iden-
tity thought experiments, trauma has traditionally
been both an impossibility and an improbability.
Therefore, it turns out that these examples are not
based on a universally applicable context at all, but
rather are limited to a figure who is invulnerable to
trauma despite repeated violent experiences. The con-
ditions of possibility and impossibility in thought ex-
periments are determined by the limits of the author’s
imagination, which in turn are shaped by the author’s
vantage point, existing knowledge, curiosity or its
lack, and experience. The realm of an abstract
thought experiment is not universal but is rather par-
ticular to the author’s context and worldview.
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However, the disciplinary form of philosophy has tra-
ditionally demanded that the particular context be
generalized and presented as universal.
Another reason to choose examples distant from the
contemporary social context of the intended reading
audience has to do with the perception that details
can compromise philosophical rigor. If an argument
is embedded in a particular social context, its focus
on questions about an abstract philosophical problem
might be derailed by debates about the details of
class, race, sexuality, and gender that were only meant
to be incidental and not essential to the examples.
Mary Midgley once pondered what details would best
serve her argument against ethical relativism. She
states that the criteria for illustrative details should be
something “remote” enough so that “we shall prob-
ably find it easier to think calmly about it” (1981 ,
2014, 1 1 ) . (She eventually settles on an erstwhile Ja-
panese samurai practice, a practice remote from her-
self and her readers) . The social and geographical
location of Midgley and her intended audience is a
particular one, and it is relevant to the search for an
example that is “remote” from it. Already, such an ex-
ample is not universal but particular, and ironically
relative to the location of the audience. Of course,
“remote” is an entirely relative term as it depends
upon the vantage point of the viewer. Making a case
for an objective, universal moral standard through ex-
amples which must be “remote” so that different
audiences situated in different places can agree to its
universality carries within it much comic irony. At
the same time, such a contradiction is worthy of seri-
ous philosophical exploration and can be carried out
by interrogating the social location, context, and
vantage point of the inquirer.
One of the most widely circulated objections to
Tuvel’s “In Defense ofTransracialism” was that the es-
say’s argument was not sufficiently situated in ac-
counts of the lived experiences, histories, and
perspectives of marginalized groups. As this section
seeks to demonstrate, such objections would be more
fruitful if they were situated within a broader critique
of modern Western philosophy. The generalization of
one’s own context and vantage point as abstract and
universal is a long-standing formal practice in the dis-
cipline, despite being critically challenged by many
readers writing from within and outside of the discip-
line. While the discussion of personal identity shows
the effects of abstraction and universality on a micro-
level analysis of the self, we may ask how these formal
methods shape our understanding ofmore macro and
global institutions, and narratives of our social-polit-
ical past.
Much of the field of postcolonial/decolonial theory
has been dedicated to searching out a beneficial legacy
of the universal (e.g., democratic equality and justice)
to guide systems of law and political institutions and
sorting this from a harmful legacy (e.g., universal his-
tory and universal progress) that is routinely used to
justify state violence. It helps to turn to Dipesh
Chakaravarty, who makes an important intervention
into the formal conventions of the philosophy of his-
tory. He shows that major European philosophers
who espoused Enlightenment ideas of democracy and
freedom as a universal good also accepted, if not pro-
moted, the European expansion of empires in South
Asia and Africa. Chakrabarty draws our attention
specifically to John Stuart Mill, a philosopher who
held these two seemingly opposing beliefs. On the
one hand, Mill claimed that the best sort of govern-
ment was a democratic one while, on the other hand,
he believed that Asians and Africans were not yet
ready or sufficiently civilized to self-govern (Chakra-
barty 2000, 8) . How are such contradictory claims
theoretically sustained in philosophy? According to
Chakrabarty, both claims build upon a historicist
construction of Europe’s past. Here is how this con-
struction works: narrators of European history divvy
up their past into specific periods or eras, such as
“medieval,” “modern,” “feudal,” and “capitalist.” Each
period is identified by specific characteristics in its
modes of thought and production, its values, and its
cultural system, as though the other periods are dis-
creet and separate spheres with little iteration of earli-
er cultural ideas and practices. These periods or eras
are then placed into a progressive order whereby one
period indicates “backwardness” and another signifies
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“progress.” This allows for the construction of a his-
torical narrative whereby feudalism progresses to cap-
italism, and medievalism progresses to modernity.
However, major Enlightenment thinkers did not ac-
knowledge how these historicist categories were based
on narratives of Europe’s intellectual and material
past. Instead, they framed it as the fixed trajectory of
all world history and world future. Conveniently, by
their own measure, Europeans had nearly reached the
teleological end of universal history. Having arrived
there first, it fell upon them to guide their colonies
towards humanity’s foretold destiny. With this new
understanding of world history, one that is not par-
ticular to any context because it has been abstracted
away from all contexts, it is no longer a contradiction
to proclaim both democracy as the highest form of
government, and Europe as the right or best imperial
ruler of South Asia and Africa. In fact, such a rule
fully accords with democracy because it enables the
colonizers to teach the colonized how to rule them-
selves.
It is important for Chakrabarty that his readers re-
cognize how the phenomena of political modernity,
such as civil society, the liberal state, government
bureaucracy, and citizenship are the products of
Europe’s intellectual and material past (2000, 9) .
However, the particularity of modernity’s historical
context had to be erased in order to make modernity
the teleology of world history and Europe’s advance-
ment towards that universal goal. Not only is that
context decontextualized, but the specific vantage
point of the philosopher-historian is also erased.
When the historicist story of Europe’s past is assigned
a universal status, its thinkers are simultaneously con-
ferred an omniscient point of view that allows them
to look into the past, present, and future of the entire
world from everywhere and nowhere.
What is at stake in representing our past and future
in abstract and universalizing forms? These forms,
that continue to thrive in the discipline of philo-
sophy, have wreaked great epistemic and material
harms the world over, particularly in the Global
South. For over two centuries now, the story of man-
kind’s “progress” has become the sedimented grounds
on which Europe and later the United States have le-
gitimized imperialism and routine wars. More recently,
in 2001 , the US military launched “Operation Endur-
ing Freedom” by driving tanks into Afghanistan. To
aid these efforts, images of Afghan women in burqas
were widely circulated in the US and were effective in
erasing narratives of economic and social damage
caused by twenty years of covert US war in Afgh-
anistan, and in creating a chivalric narrative of res-
cuing Afghan women (Mahmood 2005; Abu-Lughod
2013) . The US government congratulated itself for
bringing freedom and modernity to the women
(United States, 2004) . Soon after the invasion, The
New York Times contributed to this idyllic picture of
Afghanistan having nearly arrived at the teleological
end of history. Women, liberated and joyous, are now
“uncovering their faces, looking for jobs, walking hap-
pily with female friends, on the street, and even host-
ing a news show, on Afghan television,” announced an
essay unironically titled “Liberating the Women of
Afghanistan” (The New York Times 2001 ) . The idea of
universal history hurtling towards modernity with the
US at the helm continues to function as justification
for invasions and imperialism. Moreover, as Saba
Mahmood points out, such a narrative succeeds in
erasing accounts of the devastated living conditions of
Afghan women due to the war.
The formal attributes of philosophy need to be seri-
ously reckoned with in the context of its harms. It is in
this regard that we should receive our inheritance of
social and political philosophy with a critical perspect-
ive, principally by asking how we can draw on its
nourishing legacy without reiterating its devastating
effects. [4] An understanding of long-standing discip-
linary forms can also guide how we critically unpack
the Hypatia controversy. The open letter does not call
for an engagement with Tuvel’s essay but rather its re-
traction on the grounds that “[i] ts continued availabil-
ity causes harm.” Such a framing of the charge
effectively lets the discipline off the hook but places
Tuvel at the center, making her answerable for centur-
ies-old epistemic harms wreaked by claims to abstrac-
tion and universality.5
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Questions that seek to interrogate the theoretical im-
plications of assumed universal contexts are often
treated within the discipline of philosophy as a spe-
cial interest topic. Inquiries about the particular con-
text of philosophical questions or the vantage point
of the inquirer have not seemed to affect either the
contents of the philosophical canon or how it is
commonly taught in American classrooms. For in-
stance, John Stuart Mill’s support for colonization is
usually categorized as a discreet topic with no bear-
ings on his ethical and political writings. Mill is
taught and often written about as though his point
of view does not come from a specific location and
time but from a space-less and timeless context. Or,
think about how common it is to teach Immanuel
Kant’s writings on ethics and politics as universal
questions emerging from universal contexts, without
interrogating how they were affected by his anthro-
pological writings on race. Kant’s writings, like all
other writings in the philosophical canon, emerge
from very specific historical contexts; this is over-
looked, however, when organizing the canon into the
curriculum. As a discipline, philosophy has tradi-
tionally been uncurious about the historical and so-
cial context of its own canon, and it continues to
remain so in many of its areas. Accordingly, it is all
the more important to create conditions in which to
foster difficult and productive disagreement.
At the heart of Tuvel’s essay lies an analogy between
the way that gender identity and racial identity are
constituted and claimed. Tuvel seeks to make both
identities performatively constituted in order to al-
low for more freedom in how they can be claimed.
Representation of race as a socially constructed iden-
tity that can be challenged performatively is both a
common trope and a common subject of contention
in literature on passing. The trope itself is not new.
However, the more worrisome aspect ofTuvel’s essay
is that all racial passing is cast as the same. Tuvel ab-
stracts some principles of racial passing regardless of
which identity one has been socially assigned, which
identity one seeks to claim, or how one seeks to
claim it. She dubs this process “transracialism” (a
term originally coined by Janice Raymond to deny
recognition of transgender identity) . The framework
ofTuvel’s iteration of “transracialism” cannot account
for the differences between black-to-white passing
and white-to-black passing in present-day America or
its past. What kinds of knowledge are erased when we
seek to abstract the idea of race, racial identity, and
racial passing by overlooking the particular context of
different racial identities, their histories, locations,
and the power relations among and within the
groups?
Forms of Identity Analogies
One question that the Hypatia controversy has re-
turned to the forefront of disciplinary conversation is:
How should we understand identity analogies? This
seemed to be the major point of contention on social
media during the controversy, with some calling for
an end to all identity analogies. How can we negotiate
this demand in the context of existing feminist dis-
cussions on identity and their analogies? Different
forms of identity analogies have been constructed to-
wards different political ends in the US; sometimes to
secure rights for marginalized groups and at other
times to limit, if not deny, rights to marginalized
groups.6 Since the 1960s, civil rights arguments in the
American judiciary have been made in courtrooms
through “like race arguments” or analogies with exist-
ing anti-discrimination rights for racial minorities
who are recognized as the first constituency to gain
protections and freedoms through identity-based
rights.7 One productive way to respond to the Hypa-
tia controversy involves sorting through some forms
of identity analogy to unpack the freedoms and harms
they enable.
Black feminists such as Patricia Hill Collins and bell
hooks have argued that analogical arguments about
discrimination faced by “women” and “people of col-
our,” predominantly made by white feminists, fail to
recognize the intersections between the identity cat-
egories. Such analogies effectively erase the experi-
ences and struggles that are particular to women of
colour. The thinkers demand a recognition of identity
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categories as intertwined and varied when mapped
on a person. The form of intersecting categories does
not readily yield identity analogies. Consider how an
analogical argument which asserts that women face
employment discrimination like people of colour and
so deserve similar legal protections appears to require
that one imagine the category ofwomen as white and
ignore the intersection of “women of colour” who, by
virtue of belonging to both categories, are not like
either category but are both.
Although the form of intersecting identities may
seem resistant to an analogical relationship, it is pos-
sible to arrange the analogical argument in a way that
the point of intersection lies at the center of the
frame, rather than outside of it. For instance, a case
seeking protection against discrimination based on
sexual orientation can be made with an analogy to
racial discrimination by focusing explicitly on queer
persons of colour who need legal protection as queer
persons of colour. Serena Mayeri explores the ex-
ample of Pauli Murray, an African American lawyer
who formulated an influential form of race and
gender analogy, in her case for the inclusion of wo-
men under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964.
She pointed to the position occupied by black wo-
men who, at the time, were supposedly entitled to
protection against discrimination (as a racial minor-
ity) but were denied protection against discrimina-
tion (as women). How is a black woman who is
repeatedly denied employment able to tell if it is
based on her race, her gender, or both? Until she is
protected from discrimination against both, she will
continue to suffer discrimination, which may very
well be on the basis of her race (from which she is os-
tensibly protected) , or from her race and gender sim-
ultaneously. Murray invoked the figure of “Jane
Crow” to draw on a “race-sex parallel to highlight [. .
. ] that the eradication of racial discrimination was
impossible without the inclusions of black women in
employment protections” (Mayeri 2001 , 1045) .
One of the main limitations of analogical arguments
as the basis for seeking redress is that the legal rem-
edy can only be modelled on existing protections of
the group to which one will be compared. While
identity analogies are unavoidable in civil rights ad-
vocacy, the identity with which one is yoked in an
analogy is open for strategic alterations. The stakes are
very high in choosing the identity group (whose
claims of injury and redress are already recognized)
for the analogical argument. Attempts to make new
pairings of identity groups in the service of political
advocacy and social acceptance, as Tuvel does, are
already a part of the disciplinary tradition. Once
again, Tuvel’s essay observes an established practice in
feminist philosophy. For example, we may turn to
feminist philosopher Chris Cuomo who argues that
queer acceptance should be secured through an ana-
logy with the right to religious practice rather than
the prevailing comparisons with racial minority rights
(2008) . The particular pairing of the analogy matters
because laws against racial discrimination in the US
are based on a conception of racial identity that is
unchanging and immutable (i.e. identity as who one
is) , whereas laws for exercising religious freedoms are
based on a conception of identity that requires af-
firmation and practice (i.e. identity as what one does) .
Since homophobia often takes the form of “love the
sinner, hate the sin,” she calls for a social re-conceptu-
alization of queer identity that is understood in terms
of queer acts. By calling for changes in the identity
pairing from racial identity to religious identity, she is
inviting her readers to change how sexual orientation
is ontologically understood from what one is to what
one does.
In addition to the specific liberatory possibilities
shown by Cuomo, let us consider other urgent reas-
ons for moving away from formulating identities as
fixed and immutable. Writing for an audience of civil
rights advocates, Janet Halley asks, “[h] ow should a
critical politics of the law think about the possible co-
ercive effects of identity-based advocacy?” (2000, 44) .
After a 1938 landmark judgement against racial dis-
crimination claimed that race was an “immutable”
identity situated in “a discreet insular community,”
subsequent anti-discrimination cases for other mar-
ginalized groups, particularly gays and lesbians, have
cited similar conditions. However, as Halley reminds
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us, an analogy can often work both ways. For in-
stance, if one claims that B is like A, on the grounds
of X and so should enjoy the same rights as A, then
one is also implicitly claiming that A is also like B in
terms of X. Typically, the effect of this has been that
judges who oppose the rights of B start making the
requirement of X more and more stringent (Halley
2000) . This has had negative effects on both group A
and group B. In the response to gay rights advocacy
using “like race” arguments, judges who opposed gay
rights sought to narrow the criteria of immutability,
which in turn affected ongoing and future race-based
anti-discrimination cases. The criteria of “immutab-
ility” became more rigorously applied, which means
that, in the courtroom, racial identity was being con-
structed as fixed and unchanging. Accordingly, any
mutable aspects of one’s identity were edged out
from the category of race. This implies that racial
discrimination (such as prohibiting black women
employees from wearing braids or telling Latino em-
ployees that they cannot speak in Spanish at work)
becomes morally acceptable if one can assimilate
(Halley 2000) . This also affects groups of “theoretic-
ally mutable characteristics” such as those fighting
against discrimination on the basis of fatness (Halley
2000, 66) . As a result of the more rigorous criteria
for the “like race” analogy, it becomes more difficult
to seek protection under the reified requirement of
immutability because it implies that if it is possible
for one to lose weight, then discrimination based on
weight should not be protected by the law; one
should simply lose the weight. How did all of this af-
fect queer communities who were seeking rights
through “like race” arguments? Queer groups began
policing identity-based claims within the com-
munity. If one has access to gay rights by establishing
that one is either born gay or straight, then ways of
desiring which exceed the borders of those two cat-
egories such as bisexuality, queerness, and pansexual-
ity become subject to shaming from within the
community, in addition to ostracism from outside.
Of course, this does not mean that group B (from
the analogy of B is like A) should now suffer in si-
lence and stop fighting for their legal rights (Halley
2000) . Rather, the solution might lie in how and
when we make our identity-based analogies. Halley
suggests that while we cannot (and should not) aban-
don identity analogies in the courtroom, there is an
imperative to make them more carefully. She encour-
ages us to forgo those forms of identity analogies that
are based on how identities might be ontologically
constituted (e.g., B is constituted like A), as it has
been done by Cuomo, Tuvel, and much philosophical
writing on social ontologies, but rather make them
based on the similarity of the discrimination faced by
the two groups; the harms that B suffers are similar to
the harms that A suffers, or there is a similarity in the
structure of oppression acting on both groups, or
there are similar factors at the root of their oppres-
sion.8
Concluding Reflections on the Hypatia
Controversy
It has been over a year since the Hypatia controversy
pushed Tuvel, the journal, and contemporary feminist
philosophy into the glaring public spotlight. Perhaps
the most alarming aspect of it all was the widely sup-
ported public letter that demanded retraction rather
than critical engagement with Tuvel’s article. Public
letters have typically been used as an instrument of
writing back to power. This public letter, however,
staged an inversion of the genre: it was crafted and
supported by leading figures of disciplinary and insti-
tutional authority and the criticism focused entirely
on the work of an untenured philosophy professor. It
is a chilling spectacle to witness another junior femin-
ist colleague being publicly shamed (Weinberg 2017a)
rather than engaged with and mentored for her per-
ceived academic shortcoming by senior feminists.
Another unsettling aspect of the entire controversy is
that it is often named after Rebecca Tuvel, e.g. , “The
Tuvel Affair.” This moniker misleadingly suggests that
Tuvel’s argument is such an aberration from the dis-
cipline that it produced a controversy. It is worth reit-
erating that Tuvel’s article is not atypical within the
context of the discipline from which it emerged. As I
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have argued earlier in this essay, her argument ob-
serves the norms of philosophy, namely, claims to
universality and abstraction, which should be ex-
amined as disciplinary forms in relation to the harms
they cause. The origin of the controversy, however,
seems to lie less in the unusualness of the article and
more in the escalating public response to academic
writings on social media. In this case, it began with
rumblings on Twitter and Facebook, which galvan-
ized into the now-famous public letter with 830 sig-
natories. Before the letter could be delivered, the
associate board of editors apologized for publishing
Tuvel’s article. As the article had already passed the
journal’s peer review process and had already been
published, this move was unprecedented in the dis-
cipline. Then, philosophy blogs and national newspa-
pers picked up the story and dubbed it a controversy.
Naming the controversy after Tuvel places her at the
center of the frame all over again, and risks a danger-
ous precedent for emerging scholars in the discipline.
Endnotes
1 . One of the main critiques ofTuvel’s article, namely,
its exclusion of the socio-historical contexts and writ-
ings of the very marginalized groups who both con-
stitute the object of analysis and are deeply affected
by such theoretical inquiries, is essentially related to
broader questions about the discipline of philosophy.
Sabrina Hom shows that the elision of two centuries
of African American literature on passing in Tuvel’s
essay is not new in feminist philosophy: Tuvel’s omis-
sions heed an existing tradition of exclusionary cita-
tional practices established by senior feminist
philosophers, including Christine Overall and
Cressida Heyes. Through a close reading of literature
on passing, Hom demonstrates that philosophical
questions that are posed on the basis of speculations
about passing and not on the basis of its two-hun-
dred-year-old literary history are often rendered
moot, if not misleading, due to the absence of relev-
ant citations and readings. For instance, Heyes (2006)
frames the main challenge of passing as a moral issue
about dishonesty, rather than about the loss of com-
munity and family for the marginalized community
and the passer, as it has been framed in African
American literature. Likewise, Overall’s question
about how “passing might amount to betrayal of
group identity” (Hom 2018, 35) overlooks the legacy
of that question in contemporary debates about
mixed-race identity claims in the twenty-first-century
United States census. Such a critique also overlooks
the possibility of someone who passed and drew on
their new positions to engage in politics towards racial
justice (Piper 1991 , 9) . All of these questions have
been fiercely debated in literature from the perspect-
ives of those who have been most affected by them.
Hom contends that by overlooking the literature on
passing, one runs the risk of asking questions that
prioritize “the position of a white gaze” (Hom 2018,
34) .
2. Caroline Levine (2015) unpacks the ways in which
forms/structures impose upon us to organize, or dis-
organize our social, political, and cultural worlds. I
draw on her work to think about the formal dimen-
sions of the discipline of philosophy.
3. Feminist philosophers have long explored the
problems of assuming the universal category of cit-
izen, human, or person as a cisgender man. Susan
Mendus (2001 ) argues that democracy does not allow
for equal participation of men and women when the
citizen is imagined as a man. Debra Bergoffen (2003)
has illustrated the importance of thinking of the cat-
egory of human as differently sexed in order to make
recognizable sexual violence during war as a crime
against humanity.
4. Examples of such work in philosophy include the
Creolizing The Canon Series (NY: Rowman & Little-
field) edited by Jane Ann Gordon and Neil Roberts in
which questions about race, empire, and theories of
history inform close readings of canonical figures such
as Hegel and Rousseau.
5. A similar argument is made by Amy Olberding
(2017), who in a blog post on Feminist Philosophers,
makes a plea to “to stop symbolically conscripting
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Rebecca Tuvel into the role of personifying all of
[the] systemic issues that attach to the profession at
large.”
6. See Mayeri (2001 ) for a critical legal history of
“gender is like race” analogies. This analogy was in-
strumental in the advocacy for white women’s rights
in Antebellum America, and later as a feminist legal
strategy from the 1960s in cases such as inclusion of
“gender” in title VII, and then again during the
1990s in arguments for legal remedies for Violence
Against Women Act. Not coincidently, the same
analogy was politically mobilized in the opposite
direction in the nineteenth century by defenders of
slavery and of white women’s subordination within
patriarchy.
7. Halley (2000) critically unpacks gay rights cases
that rely on “like race” arguments to demonstrate
which have more coercive effects would need to be
rethought. However, she finds that calling an end to
identity analogies is off the table since identity ana-
logies is the only recognizable form of civil rights
advocacy in the US. As she explains, “the ethical in-
quiry [into ‘like race’ arguments] has to be conduc-
ted, I think on an assumption that asking the
advocates of gay, women’s, or disabled people’s rights
to give up ‘like race’ similes would be like asking
them to write their speeches and briefs without us-
ing the word ‘the.’ ‘Like race’ arguments are so in-
trinsically woven into American discourses of equal
justice that they can never be entirely forgone. In-
deed, analogies are probably an inescapable mode of
human inquiry and are certainly so deeply ingrained
into the logics of American adjudication that any
proposal to do without them altogether would be
boldly utopian. . . .” (46)
8. For a more detailed discussion on different forms
of analogical argument see Serena Mayeri (2001 ) .
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